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Abstract: Colin McGinn has argued that consciousness is a nonspatial 
phenomenon. McGinn’s arguments for the nonspatiality of 
consciousness are presented and then criticized. It is concluded that 
consciousness may be as spatial as electric charge and different kinds of 
abilities. 
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ccording to Descartes, the physical world (res extensa) is essentially 
extended, whereas mental substances (res cogitans) are nonspatial 
entities; i.e., they are indivisible and have no shape, size, texture, and 
cannot be located in space. Colin McGinn agrees with Descartes that the mind 
is nonspatial, but McGinn’s perspective on the mind-body problem is a kind of 
property dualism, not substance dualism, entailing that conscious states are 
unexplainable and nonspatial properties of brains.1  
In the first part of the paper I will present McGinn’s arguments for the 
nonspatiality of consciousness. In the second part I will cast doubt about these 
arguments and argue that consciousness may be as spatial as electric charge and 
abilities.         
 
McGinn’s Arguments 
According to McGinn, a phenomenon is nonspatial if it does not fall 
under the pre-theoretical or scientific spatial predicates like ‘place’, ‘area’, 
‘volume’, ‘texture’, ‘configuration’, ‘solidity’, ‘shape’ and ‘being composed of 
spatial parts’. The scientific spatial predicates are derived from scientific 
theories about space, including Quantum Mechanics and the Special and 
General Theories of Relativity.2 McGinn makes two different arguments for 
                                                 
1 See Colin McGinn, ”Consciousness and space,” in Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2 
(1995), 220-230;  Colin McGinn, The Character of Mind. Second Edition (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1998); Colin McGinn, The Mysterious Flame (New York: Basic Books, 1999). 
2 Unless dealing specifically with the distinction between pre-theoretical and scientific 
spatial predicates, I will simply write ‘spatial predicates.’ 
A 
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the nonspatiality of consciousness: ‘the predicate argument’ and ‘the 
observability argument.’  
The predicate argument.  The essence of the predicate argument is 
that, because we cannot apply all the spatial predicates to describe conscious 
states, conscious states must be nonspatial. Consider a visual experience (E) – a 
yellow flash. Associated with E is a neural event (N) in the brain. McGinn 
claims that N does admit of spatial description, but not E. E is not located at 
any specific place, it takes up no particular volume of space, and it has no 
spatial dimensionality, texture or shape. Asking for E’s spatial properties is a 
category mistake, like asking for the spatial properties of numbers.3 Conscious 
states do not fall under spatial predicates; one does not speak of a twinge of 
anxiety as occurring five centimeters behind the right ear, or assert that an 
experience of smell of Camembert is 5 cm left of the visual experience of red. 
Thus, we cannot use spatial predicates to describe the relations between 
different experiences, and since conscious states do not fall under spatial 
predicates they must be nonspatial.  
The observability argument.  The root of McGinn’s observability 
argument is the premise that conscious states cannot be perceived: 
“consciousness enables us to perceive the world, but it is not itself a 
perceptible thing.”4 Even though an organism’s behavior and neuronal activity 
is perceptible (by using brain-imaging technologies like PET and fMRI), we 
cannot perceive its experiences. According to McGinn, consciousness is not 
unobservable in the same way as elementary particles, because elementary 
particles are definitely located in space, and the main cause of their 
unobservability is simply their smallness. McGinn claims that consciousness is 
nonspatial in a more fundamental way, because even God could not perceive 
conscious states and abstract entities as spatial phenomena, but could perceive 
elementary particles, if they exist, as distributed in space.5 
McGinn criticizes a popular argument for spatial conscious states, that 
we in our daily lives locate conscious states in the vicinity of the brain or the 
body. McGinn agrees that most people do not believe that a person’s 
conscious states are located away from one’s body, and so one does locate 
conscious states spatially, at least in this rudimentary sense. However, McGinn 
does not think that this common sense conception of conscious states 
undermines the thesis of the nonspatiality of the mental, because we do not 
locate conscious states by perceiving them to be close to bodies and brains, but 
only by trading upon certain causal considerations.  
I am where that body is whose physical states beat most directly on my 
mental state; and my states of consciousness are situated in the vicinity of that 
brain whose activity is most directly implicated in the causal relations 
controlling my mental life.6   
                                                 
3 McGinn, ”Consciousness and space,” 220. 
4 McGinn, The Mysterious Flame, 113. 
5 McGinn, ”Consciousness and space,” 221. 
6 Ibid.,  221-222. 
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Thus, minds have only a derivative relation to space by being 
correlated with brain states that can be spatially located. McGinn asserts that, 
even though consciousness has a spatial-physical foundation, consciousness is 
not necessarily spatial. Our knowledge of physical reality, our knowledge about 
spatial-physical properties and entities, is not sufficient to explain 
consciousness. Therefore, there must be some hidden nonspatial features that 
contribute to determining consciousness.     
The unobservability or unperceivability of consciousness constitutes 
an important premise in McGinn's argument for consciousness’ nonspatiality. 
Consciousness is not perceptible, and no type of sense organs or measuring 
instruments could be imagined that would enable us to perceive 
consciousness.7 Consciousness is therefore a nonspatial phenomenon.  
 
1. Conscious states are phenomena that cannot be observed. 
2. A phenomenon is spatial if and only if it can be observed. 
    _____________________________________________ 
 
3. Conscious states are nonspatial phenomena 
 
McGinn’s first premise is that conscious states cannot be observed. 
Consciousness is in this sense ‘invisible’, we cannot directly observe other 
organisms’ experiences. This premise is closely related to the problem of other 
minds, because it states that observations cannot decide what kind of 
experiences the organisms have, or whether they are conscious at all. 
Observations cannot tell us whether snails, spiders and other insects have 
conscious experiences. Let’s say that according to theory T1, organism O is 
conscious but according to theory T2, O is non-conscious. These conclusions 
may be based on some observable characteristics like the amount of neurons. 
T1 and T2 are not testable in the sense that we can decide by observation 
which theory is correct, because as McGinn argues, consciousness is 
unobservable.         
The second premise is a biconditional containing two different 
statements. First, if a phenomenon can be observed, it must be spatial. The 
truth of this conditional seems obvious, because it is difficult to imagine 
observing something nonspatial. But this conditional is irrelevant for the 
subsequent arguments. The second premise also asserts that, if a phenomenon 
is spatial, it can in principle be observed. This looks prima facie plausible because 
even spatial entities like bacteria, despite being invisible to the naked eye, are 
detectable by advanced instruments like electron microscopes. Elementary 
particles, if not observable to the naked eye or even by instruments, are at least 
observable in principle. Consciousness, as a genuine nonspatial phenomenon, 
cannot be observed even in principle, and therefore constitutes a nonspatial 
dimension in the universe in addition to the known spatial dimensions. We 
                                                 
7 McGinn, The Mysterious Flame, 114. 
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have no conception what it is to perceive conscious states as spatial entities, 
consciousness is therefore nonspatial simpliciter.8 
 
Some problems with McGinn’s arguments   
 
The observability argument.  The second premise in McGinn’s 
argument – the conditional that states that a phenomenon is spatial only if it 
can be observed – is problematic because we are not entitled to pass from the 
statement that a phenomenon is ‘invisible’ or unobservable to the conclusion 
that it is nonspatial. This is an invalid inference, because not being perceptible 
does not entail nonspatiality, as illustrated by Quantum Mechanics. Quantum 
Mechanics teaches that we can only know the probability that a single particle 
is inside or outside a region of space. According to the most common 
interpretation, Quantum Mechanics supplies complete information regarding 
the particle’s pre-measurement state, and in its pre-measurement state the 
particle is without a definite position. This pre-measurement state is called a 
‘superposition’ and implies that the particle is both inside and outside the 
region at the same time. Even though we cannot observe a particle in its super-
positioned state, the particle in this state is nonetheless a spatial phenomenon, 
because it is described by the Schrödinger equation (the wave-function), which 
refers to spatial coordinates. The moment we measure the particle’s position, 
the wave-function will collapse and then the particle will have a definite 
position. Since a particle’s super-positioned state is a spatial phenomenon that 
cannot be observed, the second premise is thrown into question. 
Unobservability and nonspatiality are not co-extensional.       
The predicate argument.  McGinn often refers to our use of pre-
theoretical spatial predicates and common sense conception of conscious states 
– e.g. that pains have no shape, solidity and size etc – as an argument for the 
nonspatiality of consciousness. It sounds strange to talk about beliefs, desires 
and pains as if they have volumes, solidity and lengths. However, common 
sense is not a criterion for truth. Neuropsychological data indicate that mental 
activity is the same as brain activity, so mental states may be usefully described 
using spatial concepts. But McGinn takes a very conservative attitude towards 
how scientists should be allowed to talk about mental states. However, Jerome 
Shaffer asserts that language rules for locating mental states in space (the brain) 
can be adopted because nothing in the way we teach the use of mental 
predicates rules out spatially located mental states.9 Due to brain-imaging 
technologies (PET and fMRI), among other factors, it has become almost 
                                                 
8 There has been a debate whether McGinn’s thesis of the nonspatiality of 
consciousness is consistent with the Special Theory of Relativity. According to the Special 
Theory of Relativity, if something is located in time, then it must also be located in space. Since 
conscious states are located in time, they must also be located in space. See Sophie R. Allen, “A 
space oddity: Colin McGinn on consciousness and space,” in Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13 
(2006), 61-82. I don’t intend to contribute to this debate in this paper.   
9 Jerome Shaffer, “Could mental states be brain processes?” in The Journal of Philosophy, 
58 (1961), 813-822. 
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commonplace to refer to thoughts and other mental states as ‘located in the 
brain.’ One may therefore contend that we have already adapted Shaffer’s 
language rules.  
On the other hand, this critique may be overly simplistic. We are not 
introspectively aware that pain has a volume, shape, texture or solidity, and this 
is a phenomenological fact that must be considered. A problem with this reply, 
however, is that it is a fallacy to pass from ‘I am not introspectively aware that 
conscious states are spatial’ to ‘I am introspectively aware that conscious states 
are nonspatial.’ Conscious states may have properties (like being spatial) that 
are not revealed by introspection.10 This restates the well-worn argument that 
introspection represents a limited source of knowledge about our mental states. 
In fact, McGinn agrees that introspection is a limited source of knowledge 
about the nature of consciousness and how consciousness is related to the 
physical world, but he does not seem to realize that this may undermine his 
own conclusion of the nonspatiality of consciousness.11   
If we agree with McGinn that conscious states do not satisfy the 
criteria of being spatial phenomena, we may also be forced to deny that abilities 
are spatial phenomena. The ability to go skiing is a property of certain persons’ 
bodies. This property is a disposition, and a person has this ability also when 
the ability is not manifested. The ability to go skiing may be difficult to locate 
(is it located in the brain, in certain parts of the body, or throughout the whole 
body?), and it seems even more difficult, not to say meaningless or impossible, 
to ascribe a size, texture, solidity or shape to abilities. Is my ability to go skiing 
behind, to the left or under my ability to play ping-pong? Do these abilities 
have the same shape or texture? We do not speak about abilities as if they are 
spatial in this sense, but it is nevertheless quite obvious that abilities are spatial 
phenomena. Abilities are probably easier to explain and describe than 
conscious states, but the fact that a phenomenon (like consciousness) is 
difficult or impossible to explain or describe does not imply that it is 
nonspatial.  
A possible objection to this argument is that some features of complex 
abilities like skiing or ping-pong may be nonspatial in the sense that it is 
impossible for a system to have some of these abilities without also having 
some nonspatial conscious states. It is, however, difficult to find a convincing 
argument for a necessary relationship between the mentioned abilities and 
conscious states. Also, it is easy to imagine a simple robotic system, which we 
have no reason to believe is conscious, but which has certain abilities like 
moving around and discriminating between different kinds of objects. We may 
further suppose that these abilities are well integrated with each other and 
                                                 
10 For an analogous argument see David M. Armstrong, “The headless woman illusion 
and the defence of materialism,” in Analysis, 29 (1968), 48-49. Antoine Arnauld used the same 
kind of argument when he criticized Descartes' substance dualism, for even though thought is 
the mind's essential property, it doesn’t follow that the mind may not have other essential 
properties also (e.g. being physical) not revealed by introspection. Arnauld’s argument is found in 
the fourth set of objections to the Meditations.    
11 See Colin McGinn, The Problem of Consciousness (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1991).  
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distributed all over the robot’s body and brain. We can then repeat mutatis 
mutandis the argument above to show that abilities constitute counterexamples 
to McGinn’s criteria of spatiality.12    
Another similarity between abilities and conscious states is that we can 
use some (but not all) spatial predicates to describe and refer to them. From a 
neuro-psychological point of view it is neither false nor meaningless to say that 
the causes of mathematical abilities are mainly located in the brain, but the 
ability to go skiing is more distributed. Mathematical abilities and skiing are 
manifested by the whole person, but they may nevertheless be located more 
precisely according to their causal grounding. Analogously, conscious states like 
anxiety and experiences of colors seem to be related to different parts of the 
brain: anxiety is related to the amygdala and visual experiences are related to 
the visual cortex. Neuroscientists use spatial concepts in this loose sense when 
they describe conscious states. This may be considered sufficient to conclude 
that conscious states are spatial.13 However, McGinn may be reluctant to 
accept this conclusion, as he appears to think that a phenomenon is spatial if 
and only if it can be subsumed under all spatial predicates. He says that,  
 
. . . to allow that consciousness can be roughly located is 
not to grant it the full panoply of spatial predications. We 
still do not get predications of shape, size, dimensionality 
and so on. And this shows that such spatiality as we do 
allow to mental matters is of a second-class and derivative 
nature.14  
 
First, it is not clear what is meant by ‘second class and derivative 
spatiality’, and it is not clear how this kind of spatiality is distinguished from 
real or ‘first class’ spatiality. Spatiality does not seem to be a phenomenon that 
permits of degrees, because either a phenomenon is spatial or it is not. Second, 
it is difficult to accept that it must be a necessary condition for a phenomenon 
x to be spatial that x must fall under all spatial predicates like size, texture, solidity 
etc. Given this criterion of spatiality, even abilities must be considered 
nonspatial, because they do not have size, texture etc. Even the electrons’ 
charge will turn out to be nonspatial according to this criterion, because it is 
utterly meaningless to measure the diameter or volume of a particular charge. 
The property charge, which is measured in Coulomb, is not measured in volume 
                                                 
12 It is important to notice that I have only argued that not all abilities must have 
conscious aspects, but this is not an argument against David Lewis’ contention that conscious 
states are abilities. See David Lewis, “What experience teaches,” in The Nature of Consciousness. 
Philosophical Debates, ed. by Ned Block, Owen Flanagan and Güven Güzeldere (Cambridge Mass.: 
MIT Press, 1998).   
13 It is debated within the cognitive sciences how widely distributed conscious states 
are in the brain, but even if conscious states have no precisely defined boundaries this fact in 
itself does not constitute an argument against their spatiality, since clouds too lack precise spatial 
boundaries but are obviously spatial phenomena.     
14 McGinn, ”Consciousness and space,” 222. 
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units, but the entities that have a particular charge may have a volume, or at 
least be located in space.15 Thus, that we can use a proper subset of spatial 
predicates (e.g. that it can be located) to describe x seems to be a sufficient 
condition for phenomenon x to be spatial. From the semantic fact that it is not 
reasonable or meaningful to use all spatial predicates to describe x, we need not 
conclude that x is nonspatial, for in that case charge and abilities would also be 
nonspatial phenomena. Consciousness may therefore be a spatial property of 
the body in the same way as abilities and charge are properties of certain 
entities. Consciousness, abilities and charge are not measured in volume units, 
but they may still be spatial phenomena in virtue of being properties of 
physical entities located in space. McGinn has claimed that,  
 
In order to solve the mind-body problem we need, at a 
minimum, a new conception of space...That which we 
refer to when we use the word ‘space’ has a nature that is 
quite different from how we standardly conceive it to be; 
so different, indeed, that it is capable of ‘containing’ the 
nonspatial (as we now conceive it) phenomenon of 
consciousness.16 
 
However, a new conception of space is not necessary in order to solve 
the mind-body problem, because consciousness is as spatial as ability and 
charge. This simplifies McGinn’s account of the mind-body problem, but in 
itself does not give us any reason to be sanguine about the prospect of solving 
the mind-body problem. We are still left with the hard problem of how to 
explain the emergence of consciousness (qualia) from brain processes. Even 
though consciousness is analogous with ability, and abilities can in principle be 
given an explanation based on the body’s physiological constitution, the 
problem of the emergence of consciousness is still a mystery. However, 
theories of space appear to be orthogonal to theories about consciousness and 
the mind-body problem.  
 
Center of Philosophy, University of Stavanger, Norway 
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